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Abstract Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the
intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and indepen-
dently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This
sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of exec-
utive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as
genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops an earlier argument (Bogdan 2005a) to the effect that self-
ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes require a conscious sense of their intentional-
ity. The background assumption is that one’s grasp of the self-intentionality of one’s
body and mind in general depends on the sort of bodily and mental activities and
states that one self-regulates and on the manner of such self-regulation. The conscious
sense of self-intentionality required for self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes must
be distinguished from other senses of self-intentionality, such as bodily or sensori-
motor, and also from the resources required for the ascriptions of the thoughts and
attitudes of others. In order to mark this latter distinction, Sect. 2 surveys the difference
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between the child’s naive psychology before and after the age of 4 and suggests that,
for self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes, the difference has less to do with develop-
ments in naive psychology and more with dramatic changes in the child’s intramental
self-regulation. This truth may be obscured by nonintentional self-ascriptions, which
are based on or directed at one’s own experiences. Experiential self-ascriptions (as I
will call them) need not presuppose a sense of self-intentionality. With these critical
clarifications behind us, I will turn to the main constructive argument.
Section 3 introduces the notion of the self-regulation and surveys several of its forms
in order to identify the specific form responsible for a conscious sense of the inten-
tionality of one’s own thoughts as the key developmental premise for self-ascriptions
of attitudes, such as beliefs or intentions. According to Sect. 4, the executive devel-
opments after the age of 4 generate new capacities to simulate one’s own actions and
perceptions and, crucially for self-ascriptions, call for the self-regulation of these simu-
lations. Such self-regulated simulations are the first ontogenetic instances of thoughts
the child is aware of as her own world-directed thoughts. Their self-regulation is
carried out by an executive metasemantics, construed as a capacity to monitor and
control one’s own simulative thoughts in terms of their representational relations. It is
a intramental self-regulation that provides a sense of the intentionality of one’s own
thoughts. Section 5 explains why the development of intramental self-regulation is
late, thus causing a correspondingly late development of self-ascriptions. Section 6
reviews the argument and points to some implications.
Before proceeding, a few words about terminology. For brevity, I call the ascrip-
tions of one’s own thoughts and attitudes ‘self-ascriptions’ and those aimed at the
thoughts and attitudes of others ‘other-ascriptions’. I will be concerned only with the
self-ascriptions that register the intentionality (in the philosophical sense) or aboutness
of the thoughts and attitudes involved. The ability to register the intentionality of one’s
own bodily and mental states and activities in general amounts to (what I will call) a
‘sense of self-intentionality’—where the ‘sense’ may cover a variety of mechanisms
whose operation can, but need not, be conscious.
Since I will be focusing mostly on thoughts, I take the terminological liberty of
using the adjective ‘thoughtful’ to mean ‘pertaining to or having to do with thoughts’.
It is standard practice in recent philosophy to construe thoughts as representing the
contents of attitudes, such as desires and beliefs. On this construal, one can self-ascribe
attitudes only when one can self-ascribe thoughts. And one can self-ascribe thoughts
only when one understands them as intentionally related to what they represent. The
focus below is on what it takes to develop the capacity to self-ascribe thoughts as a
prerequisite for the self-ascription of attitudes. The basic idea will be that only simula-
tive thoughts, subject to self-regulation, afford a conscious sense of their intentionality,
thus making self-ascriptions of thoughts and hence attitudes possible.
2 Blind to one’s own intentional mind
My reading of the developmental data is that until around the age of 3–4 the child is
mostly concerned with the outside world, for obvious reasons of social and cultural
adaptation. As a result, the child’s naïve psychology is almost exclusively oriented
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toward other people, as illustrated by such dominant practices as gaze following, joint
attention, and imitation (Hobson 1993; Perner 1991; Tomasello 1999). The sponta-
neity of these practices and their well paced development suggest adaptive responses
to the pressures of social interaction, communication and cultural assimilation during
early childhood (Bogdan 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005a).
There are good reasons to think that, although finely attuned to the intentionality of
other minds, the young child is generally blind to the intentionality of her own mind.
An indirect but convincing reason is the absence in early childhood of metacogni-
tion, introspection, and autobiographical memory—all mental activities that require
an awareness of the intentionality of one’s own mental states (Bjorklund 2000; Flavell
et al. 1995; Nelson 1996). A more direct reason concerns the developmental and
cognitive asymmetries between self-ascriptions and other-ascriptions that register the
intentionality of the attitudes involved. The case of belief is symptomatic. The recog-
nition of the false beliefs of others, around 3–4, seems to precede the recognition of
one’s own false beliefs, a year or two later (Astington and Gopnik 1988; Perner 1991).
This asymmetry is further confirmed by data showing that children even younger than
3 seem to recognize, implicitly and preverbally, the false beliefs of others (but not
their own) (Clements and Perner 1994). The belief asymmetry and other attitudinal
asymmetries are not widely accepted in the developmental literature and new data
force constant revisions of earlier accounts. Nevertheless, I think that if we widen the
theoretical horizon, we will find good reasons to take these asymmetries seriously, as
I argue below and also did so elsewhere (Bogdan 1997, 2003, 2005a).
Cognitively, there are major differences between the other- and self-ascriptions,
insofar as the evidence for their intentionality is concerned. The intentionality of
other-attitudes is rather easily detectible in the visible bodily features and behaviors
of others, whereas the intentionality of self-attitudes is not visible, not in any obvi-
ous and conscious way, in one’s own behavior or mental activity. The point here is
not that children learn from visual and other forms of experience to recognize the
intentionality of their own attitudes and that of others but rather that the recognitional
abilities involved have different tasks and maturation schedules, and recruit different
resources.
The differences between intentionality-sensitive self-ascriptions and other-
ascriptions derive from a more general gap between the child’s naive psychology
before and after the age of 4. It is not just the much-discussed turn of other-ascriptions
to metarepresentation around 4, perhaps best illustrated by the false-belief test. There
are also dramatic changes, mostly neuropsychological and executive in nature, which
reorient the child’s naive psychology toward complex mental states of others and of
self, with imagined, counterfactual or abstract contents, and render the operation of
naive psychology increasingly free from the perceptual here-and-now and from current
motivation, and increasingly off-line and inferential. These changes include inhibition,
a remarkable spurt in the growth and functionality of the prefrontal cortex, and a mas-
sive shift from a simpler and mostly other-oriented naive psychology, based largely on
the left hemisphere, to a much more sophisticated successor that draws increasingly
on the executive powers of the prefrontal cortex and the interconnectivity of the right
hemisphere (Corcoran 2000; Diamond 2001). As we shall see, an important outcome
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of these neuropsychological developments is a conscious sense of the intentionality
of one’s own thoughtful mind.
The young child’s blindness to the intentionality of her own thoughts should be
carefully distinguished from the self-consciousness of her experiential mind and from
her awareness of lower-level forms of self-intentionality. Consider the experiential
mind first. The young child is surely aware of such experiences as feelings, emotions
or desires, and this awareness yields a variety of explicit experiential self-ascriptions,
thought about or even verbalized in terms of ‘I feel pain’ or ‘I am sad’ or ‘I want
an orange’ or the like. One popular view in philosophy and developmental psychol-
ogy construes the self-evidence of one’s experiences as sufficient for intentionality-
sensitive self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes. This experientialist view (if I may
so label it) underpins the introspective version of simulation, which finds that self-
ascriptions develop earlier than other-ascriptions (Goldman 1993; Harris 2000). I crit-
icized this view elsewhere (Bogdan 1997, pp. 243–249, 2005a). Besides the fact that
young children do not seem to introspect (Flavell et al. 1995), a careful reading of stan-
dard experiments reveals that children are frequently asked to report on their present
or recent past experiences (perceptions, memories, feelings) without an independent
determination of whether these experiences are actually recognized by children as
intentionally directed at their contents (Astington and Gopnik 1988; Goldman 1993;
Harris 2000). In such experiments a child may be asked, for example, whether she saw
a particular event or object X. Her positive answer may indicate visual familiarity with
X or the presence of a memory image of X but need not entail an independent recog-
nition of a past perceptual or attitudinal relation to X. This distinction is close to that
between episodic memory, which requires experiential familiarity with a past event
X, and autobiographical memory, which also requires awareness of self in relation
to X. Not surprisingly, on my reading, autobiographical memory develops as late as
do intentionality-sensitive self-ascriptions of attitudes and involves some of the same
executive novelties (Bogdan 2005a).
Besides these empirical distinctions, there is a larger conceptual issue at stake here.
An assumption of the experientalist view seems to be that if the young child knows the
type of inner experience involved (say, desire) and its content (what is desired), and
also knows that a particular sort of desire experience and a particular sort of content
are always associated, then the child knows that the desire is directed at its target and
therefore recognizes its intentionality. Thus, suppose one asks a young child what she
desires, and she says an orange. And suppose further that, under further questioning,
one also determines that the child’s answer draws on her recognition of a past experi-
ence (say, taste) associated with oranges. Doesn’t this show that the child recognizes
her desire as a mental state intentionally related to oranges? If the child recognizes
that she has a desire for oranges, isn’t this ipso facto a recognition of the desire being
about oranges (J. Perner, personal communication)? A related point can be made about
memory (or any other inner experience associated with some intentional state): isn’t
the child’s memory of an event X an experience the child recognizes as representing
X (B. Malle, personal communication)? If the answer is yes, then the young child
can be credited with an experience-based recognition of the intentionality of some
self-attitude (e.g., desire or memory).
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This is an answer I am determined to resist, for further reasons, in addition to
those noted earlier. First, a conceptual point: having an experience of X, associated
with an attitude about X, does not entail a recognition that the experienced attitude
is about X (as in the orange example above). The experience may signal the attitude
type (desire or memory) and its target (orange or some past event, respectively) but
not the intentional relation between the two. The target of the attitude is transparent
in its experience but not in relation to the experience. This is why experiencing an
attitude and its target is not yet having the concept of the attitude, insofar as the con-
cept factors in the intentional relation to the target. Young children have beliefs and
memories, distinguish them experientially from other mental types (such as desires or
perceptions), know what their contents are (what they believe or remember) but do not,
until a few years later, develop the concepts of such intentional types, qua attitudes,
and hence the recognition of their intentionality.
It may also help to look at the matter from a wider comparative angle as well. If
regular associations between one’s own experienced attitudes and their targets were
yielding a sense of the self-intentionality of the attitudes, then animals and very young
children that can associate the two ought to be able to self-ascribe attitudes in some
form. But they don’t. Regular association is not enough. A version of this reductio
applies to animals (say, dogs and parrots) that learn to associate sound or gestural
experiences with targets in the world. If such learned associations yielded a sense of
the intentionality of the experiences involved, these animals would understand word
or gesture reference as a relation. But they don’t. Indeed, the first words of human
children, around 6 months, are learned by association, without a sense that they are
intended to refer to their targets. That early understanding of words is radically differ-
ent from, and significantly inferior to, the words learned 10 or so months later through
attention shared with adults. Only the latter reveals to the child the intended refer-
entiality of words (Bogdan 2008; Tomasello 2003). And, finally, if naive psychology
itself were acquired by learning regular associations between experienced attitudes
and their contents, we should find it throughout the animal world. But we don’t.
Perhaps the most important argument—and certainly the most relevant here—
against the notion that the experience of attitudes suffices to produce a conscious
sense of their self-intentionality derives from the main conjecture of this paper, which
is that such a sense depends essentially on what world-directed or intentional aspects
of one’s mind one self-regulates and how. Animals and young children do not self-
regulate the intentional relations of their own thoughts. But they do self-regulate the
intentional relations of their sensorimotor and perceptual experiences, which is why
they have a sense, not necessarily conscious, of their sensorimotor or perceptual self-
intentionality. This is also why, I think, the young child who recognizes her desire for
an orange has at best a conscious sense of the gustatory-motor intentionality (so to
speak) of her experienced desire (i.e., of what she is poised to do and feel, given the
anticipated taste) rather than a conscious sense of her desire as an attitude related to
its target. This last point deserves some elaboration.
Awareness of selfhood and self-intentionality operates at different levels. One may
have a sense of a thoughtful self, of being the author of one’s own thoughts (compro-
mised in schizophrenia, for example), which is distinct from a sense of a sensorimotor
self, which is one’s sense of ownership of and control over one’s sensorimotor activ-
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ities (normally not impaired in schizophrenia). Young children, and most animals,
have a sense of sensorimotor but not of thoughtful self. I return below to this variety
of selves.
A similar sensorimotor/perceptual/thoughtful distinction works for self-intention-
ality. Young children and most animals have a sense of their own sensorimotor or per-
ceptual intentionality—that is, a sense that their sensorily or visually guided actions
are directed toward external targets. For example, they can self-regulate their sensory
approach to or perceptual perspective on a target (Russell 1996). But, I suggest, only
older children develop a sense of their own thoughtful intentionality—that is, a recog-
nition that their own thoughts represent something. This recognition is crucial for the
self-ascriptions of attitudes, as is the recognition of thoughtful selfhood.
To sum up, so far, the young child’s thoughtful mind is not yet conscious of itself as
intentional, unlike her experiential mind, which is largely conscious of its own experi-
ences. The young child may be aware of thoughts as experiences but not as intentional
representations. The theoretical and experimental challenge is not to mistake the young
child’s experiential self-ascriptions for self-ascriptions that are intentionality-sensitive
and therefore not to think that the young child’s ability to self-ascribe attitudes is sim-
pler and easier than it actually is, or that it emerges earlier than it actually does. The
question, then, is what it takes to understand one’s own thoughts and hence attitudes
as intentional. This is the question explored next.
3 Self-regulated minds
The guiding idea is that a conscious sense of the intentionality of one’s own thoughts,
as a prerequisite of self-ascriptions of attitudes, depends on thoughts becoming tar-
gets of one’s mental agency in general and of self-regulation in particular. This idea,
initially far removed from the domain of naive psychology, takes us (briefly) to the
basics of life—goal-directedness and self-regulation.
The background premise is simple and familiar. To be successful in life, organisms
must monitor and control or, in a hyphenated word, self-regulate the means by which
they reach their goals. Organisms have a variety of processes and activities that are
self-regulated. In most species, these processes and activities are physiological, senso-
rimotor, perceptual, and behavioral. Some species, mostly primate, also self-regulate
their higher mental states and activities. The ability to regulate the world-relatedness
of one’s mental and behavioral states and activities is an intrinsic part of being inten-
tionally directed at the world. This self-regulatory ability contains the seeds of (what
we may call, quite liberally) an executive metasemantics—metasemantics, because the
organism has some way of registering and checking the intentional relations (informa-
tional, referential, representational, meaning-like, as in language) it has to targets in
the world; and executive, because of the regulatory nature of the ability itself. When
such self-regulation meets some further conditions, the executive metasemantics also
generates a conscious sense of self-intentionality in some dominant modality. When
thoughts themselves become targets of conscious self-regulation, a developmental
platform emerges for the self-ascriptions of attitudes. This is the idea developed in the
remainder of this paper. I begin with some basic notions of self and regulation, which
I need for my analysis.
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To exercise self-regulation, an organism needs a capacity (as mechanism, proce-
dure, scheme, or explicit representation) to register that it is related to some target and
also that it is on target or not, or how close to or far from it, in order to guide and cor-
rect its representations and actions. In evolving such a capacity for self-regulation, an
organism faces two evolutionary problems, whose solutions constitute the biological
pillars for a sense of self and of self-intentionality, respectively.
3.1 Senses of self
The first problem is to distinguish between the information provided by internal
resources and the information caused by the outside world. Only in this way can
an organism distinguish what it does from what the world does and thus have a sense
of authorship or ownership of its states and activities. This ability is not unlike that of
the immune system that distinguishes between its body and intruders, based on some
sense of the bodily self.
Or consider vision, for a more detailed example. The movement of an object in
the outside world results in a corresponding movement of the image of the object
on the retina. The latter is perceived by the brain as actual movement of the object.
But when the eyes are moved voluntarily, there is also self-initiated movement of
the image on the retina, which is not perceived as movement of an external object.
Why not? Because the brain makes an output (or efference or feedforward) copy of
its instructions to the eye muscles, and the output copy is translated into the expected
retinal movement. If the real retinal movement is the same as the expected one, no
outside movement is perceived. But any movement in the outside world will result
in movement of the retinal image which has no counterpart in the output copy, and
therefore will be perceived by the brain as the movement of an object in the outside
world.
This analysis of visual self-regulation has been known since the 1950’s and has
later been extended to motor self-regulation as well (Jeannerod 1997; Wolpert et
al. 1998). For our purposes, it is worth noting how the self-world distinction in
vision is achieved implicitly, procedurally and unconsciously by way of how the self-
regulatory machinery of the visual brain works. I think the same is likely to be true
of other modalities of mental activity—perceptual, conative, memorial, thoughtful,
and so on. In particular, we should not be surprised to learn that the ownership of the
thoughts (and possibly memories) of the young child (before 3–4), which seem to be
mostly perceptual or imagistic, is handled and registered more or less along the same
lines as the child’s visual images. Let us call these kinds of thoughts me-thoughts. Such
thoughts (more or less) happen to the child, caused mostly by perceptions, memories,
habits and drives, yet they are distinguished from what is going on in the outside world
and also distinguished from their proximal causes.
After the 3–4 interval, the child can be said to graduate to I-thoughts. This new kind
of thoughts reflects not only a fuller grasp of the personal pronoun but also (and relat-
edly) a multiplex mind that can initiate, operate with and control multiple thoughts,
thanks to the development of inhibition, the significant growth of the prefrontal
cortex and the increased interconnectivity of the right hemisphere (Diamond 2001).
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I-thoughts are self-initiated thoughts that are not only registered as one’s own (own-
ership) but as initiated by oneself (authorship).
Yet the self need not be—and is likely not to be—separately, explicitly and con-
sciously identified and registered in one’s I-thoughts. That would be the development
of self-thoughts, which occurs later, perhaps around the age of 6–7, as indicated by the
emergence of introspection, narrative autobiographical memory and reflexive thinking
(Flavell et al. 1995; Nelson 1996; also Bogdan 2000). The idea here is not that there
is a self somewhere in the mind, which can be targeted for explicit representation
(an idea vigorously and plausibly denied by Hume and many other philosophers),
but rather that novel self-regulatory mechanisms generate a novel form of recognition
of the authorship of one’s own thoughts. With self-thoughts one is thinking explicitly
about one’s present, past or future self-initiated and self-owned I-thoughts. Self-ascrip-
tions of thoughts and hence attitudes become possible only with the development of
I-thoughts and self-thoughts.
Yet having me-thoughts or I-thoughts or self-thoughts or indeed any other sen-
sorimotor or mental state need not lead to a sense of their intentionality. The latter
is the solution to the second major evolutionary problem faced by any active and
autonomously goal-directed organism, which is the problem of registering its own
intentionality in some world-related modality. There are several versions of the solu-
tion to this second problem. They are worth distinguishing, briefly, in order not only
to identify the one involved in attitudinal self-ascriptions but also to show its executive
credentials and pedigree.
3.2 Senses of self-intentionality
As with various selves, a sense of an organism’s target-relatedness or intentional-
ity originates in its machinery for self-regulation. In the sensorimotor modality, this
machinery functions implicitly when, say, feedback from an action is compared with
and adjusted to preset expectations or memories of prior actions. It is an implicit
work because no explicit representations need be involved in or result from such a
comparison and adjustment. As in the case of the self-world distinction, the idea is
that the machinery for self-regulation would not have evolved, and would not operate
as it does, unless its function is to register, check upon, and correct an organism’s
relatedness to its goals.
The standard forms of physiological and sensorimotor self-regulation are feedback
and feedforward. They maintain the homeostasis of an organism against perturbations
and guide its goal-directed actions. Relative to a preset value, feedback corrects per-
turbations or actions after the fact, whereas feedforward anticipates perturbations and
actions. Primitive organisms, such as bacteria, monitor and control their movements to
their goals by simple feedback mechanisms that regularly sample their surroundings.
More complex organisms evolved internal models of their environment which allow
them to anticipate by feedforward how the environment would look like in the imme-
diate future. More sophisticated such models also anticipate how the environment
would be affected by the organism’s actions and even how, as a result, the organism
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itself would be affected. Thinking may have evolved out of these latter models, as I
speculate later.
A key stage in this evolution, relevant to the present analysis, is metamotor imagery.
Think of it this way. In order to track an organism’s bodily positions relative to the
targets of its actions, motor images are fed into preset action schemas or monitored by
feedback or feedforward routines that compare snapshot by discontinuous snapshot
the sensory input with internal output copies of the targets of action. Suppose that
the organism comes under selection pressures to track its actions continuously and
modify them in terms of what the motor images represent at any given moment and of
how these images compare with the intended targets of actions. The organism would
do better if it can represent and monitor continuously the motor images themselves in
their relation to their targets. This will be the job of higher-order and explicit metamo-
tor images. The target-directedness or intentionality of motor images thus becomes an
object of metaintentional self-regulation. This may be the earliest version of an exec-
utive metasemantics—a new representational capability selected for and involved in
the executive work of self-regulation.
This executive-cum-representational innovation may have evolved when intricate
motor behaviors, possibly connected, in primates, with complex arboreal behaviors
or, in humans, with novel uses of hands, such as throwing or tool making and tool
use. Whereas first-order motor images represent actions relative to bodily states and
external targets, the metamotor images allow an explicit and continuous compari-
son between what first-order motor images represent and internal models from motor
memory—the feedback part—and action predictions made by a planning center—the
feedforward part (Damasio 1999; Jeannerod 1997).
3.3 A thoughtful mind
We reach now a critical juncture in the explanation of the formation of a sense of
thoughtful self-intentionality as a premise for self-ascriptions. Once brought under
one’s voluntary control, the metamotor images, particularly of the feedforward sort,
seem to be plausible evolutionary forerunners of thoughts as mental representations
that anticipate and rehearse or (in short) simulate actions, and hence how the world
and the organism’s place in it would or could be changed by its actions, and also
simulate perception, and hence how the world would or could look like. (These are
simulations of one’s own actions and perceptions as part of voluntary self-regulation,
and not simulations of others in a naive-psychological sense, as in other-ascriptions
or imitation.) The idea, developed next, is that thinking as simulation of action and
perception and its self-regulation constitute the early premises of a sense of thoughtful
self-intentionality and therefore of the self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes.
Before proceeding, I note that the notion of simulative thought is stronger than
the standard notion that portrays thoughts as mere mental representations. On the
latter notion, practically any organism may be said to have thoughts, usually gener-
ated by perceptual or memory inputs or schemes of action. Without arguing the point
here, I prefer the notion of an active and potentially voluntary and thus self-regulated
thinking, which is why I regard the simulations of actions and perceptions as the first
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genuine signs of thoughtfulness. In other words, I take a thoughtful mind to be one
that regulates its actions and perceptions by simulating them, and also regulates its
own simulations.
4 Thinking as simulation
It has been often said that simulative thinking is covert or suppressed behavior. It may
be more accurate to say that simulative thinking evolved—and perhaps could only have
evolved—when self-regulation became disconnected from action and aimed instead
at the preparation and planning of action. Both in evolution and ontogeny it is motor
behavior that is first simulated, prior to its execution. But action cannot be simulated
alone, without a perceptual surround. It is the primary job of mental imagery to simu-
late perception, particularly visual (Hesslow 2002). Mental imagery may thus be the
second form of self-regulatory simulation to emerge in evolution as well as human
ontogeny.
Construed as simulations of actions and perceptions, thoughts are structured rep-
resentations of which the thinker is aware as having a mind-initiated existence and
simulated or projected (as opposed to world-caused) contents that anticipate or rehearse
some future state of affairs. A thinker, in this sense, is aware of her own simulations,
does not confuse their simulated contents with world-caused contents (perceptual, for
example), and can voluntarily initiate and use the simulations to some anticipated end.
Such simulation amounts to thinking, to the extent that it is conscious and deliberate
initiation and manipulation of action images and mental images. A closer look at how
simulative thinking works reveals how it underpins a sense of the self-intentionality
of thoughts.
4.1 Thought as simulaction
I propose to call the mental simulation of action simulaction. My reading of the neu-
ropsychological literature suggests the possibility—admittedly speculative but rather
plausible—that simulaction may have evolved out of two prior self-regulatory mech-
anisms for feedforward control and metamotor imagery. The idea is that capacities
for simulaction evolved to upgrade and employ metamotor images with the aim of
anticipating and rehearsing off-line the actions to be undertaken. I first expand this
idea and then document it empirically.
We recall that the function of metamotor images is to monitor the relation be-
tween motor images, which represent the condition and position of the body, and
the targets of its action. It is the feedforward or anticipative employment of the
metamotor images that is likely to morph them into simulactive or motor-oriented
thoughts. So employed, simulactions inherit the self-regulatory function of metamo-
tor images, which consists in tracking the intentionality of one’s own body and actions
directed at external targets. The difference is that simulactions exercise this function
off-line, in advance of action. Unlike metamotor images, which are processed on-line,
automatically and unconsciously, simulactions are deliberately and consciously
intended, and constructed and manipulated off-line.
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Simulactions first emerge as new representational modalities of self-regulating
future actions directed at future targets. To be effective in fulfilling their self-reg-
ulatory intentions, the simulactions themselves must be monitored, evaluated and
controlled—that is, self-regulated, at a higher level. Only such higher-level self-reg-
ulation can distinguish deliberate simulactions from (say) motor hallucinations, form
the right simulactive intentions or improve simulactions by training and feedback.
Since simulactions rehearse off-line how the body and its actions relate to targets
in the world, the intentionality of the simulactions themselves must now be factored
into their higher-level self-regulation. The result is no longer just a sense of metamo-
tor self-intentionality, bearing on the relation of motor imagery to motor targets, but
rather a distinct and higher-level sense of a simulactive-thought-to-motor-action-to-
target set of relations—or, in short, a sense of the ideomotor intentionality of one’s
own simulactions as off-line metamotor thoughts. So construed, a sense of ideomotor
self-intentionality is necessarily a sense of one’s own simulactions being directed,
off-line, at one’s intended actions in relation to their targets. This is the idea I want
now to document empirically.
Two neuropsychological facts about simulaction support the analysis just sketched.
One fact is that the simulaction of movement seems to involve some of the same brain
areas as does the preparation of motor behavior. The same cortical overlap holds
between consciously representing an action and intentionally executing it. This means
that simulaction draws on many of the same brain resources as does the formation
of motor intentions. The only major cerebral difference between simulaction and the
intended execution of an action is the inhibition of the execution (Jeannerod 1997,
1999, 2003a,b). The other supporting fact is that the execution of an action takes the
same time as its mental simulation (Decety et al. 1989).
These results are open to divergent interpretations. One major issue is whether
simulaction is simulated movement rather than simulated perception of movement
Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, chapter 4). Leaving this interesting but difficult ques-
tion aside, the implication that matters here is this. Since metamotor imagery handles
both the simulaction and the execution of motor actions, and does so with many of
the same brain resources and in the same time period, it appears that simulaction does
employ the metamotor-imagery machinery in an anticipative or feedforward mode.
Marc Jeannerod is explicit on this point: motor representations resemble feedforward
models in that they estimate the outcome of an action without waiting for the sensory
reafference or even without performing the action. This is to be expected from a mech-
anism that plans and controls the execution of an action by simulacting it (Jeannerod
1997, p. 175). As suggested earlier, simulactions are therefore likely to emerge out of
the self-regulatory work of metamotor imagery and to inherit from that work a sense
of ideomotor self-intentionality.
Yet this is only half of the story. Unlike metamotor images, simulactions are delib-
erately and consciously initiated and handled. Therefore, the simulactor must not only
be aware of simulactions not being actual actions. She must also be aware of her
simulactions being about her own future actions as intended to be directed at some
target of interest. Jeannerod (2003b) notes that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is
activated during the preparatory stage of simulaction but not during the execution of
an action. The prefrontal cortex is the conscious initiator and manager of simulactions.
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Jeannerod also notes that (despite the inhibition of motor execution) the motor cortex is
also active during simulaction, and opines that this activity may provide information
for consciously monitoring the simulactions themselves. This monitoring informa-
tion, coming from the motor cortex, about the simulacted action, joins the information
about the goal and target of action held in working memory and available to prefrontal
self-regulation (Jeannerod 2003b). This assembly of metamotor and prefrontal infor-
mation seems to enable the simulactor to self-regulate her simulactions by tracking
their intentional relations to intended actions and their targets.
To sum up, the self-regulation of simulaction as mental activity is distributed, prob-
ably hierarchically, among several brain centers having distinct functions but ends
up providing one with a conscious sense of the intentionality of one’s own motor-
oriented thoughts. This is the key result at this point in the analysis. Given the primacy
of action and sensorimotor conation and cognition in human ontogeny, a sense of the
ideomotor intentionality of one’s own simulactions is very likely to be the child’s first
major step toward self-ascriptions of I-thoughts. It is a necessary step. But is it also
sufficient, even with language, consciousness, and some early naive-psychological
concepts thrown into the mix, all of which are available to and used by the young child
even before the age of 4? I think not, for at least two reasons.
First, simulactions would not work unless they project an action in a spatial con-
text populated by sundry objects and events in relation to the body and actions of the
agent. Such projections rely on distal perceptual information—mostly visual. These
off-line visual projections are handled by mental imagery. Second, human thinking
involves a great deal of simulation that has little if anything to do with one’s body
and actions and a good deal to do with figuring out or imagining—often abstractly
and impersonally—future, hypothetical or counterfactual situations. Such imaginative
simulation is also likely to take off from mental imagery. It turns out, ontogenetically,
that conscious and deliberately intended and manipulated mental imagery is a rather
late development.
4.2 Thought as simulimage
Despite debates over its encoding format (pictorial or language-like), there is grow-
ing neurological evidence that mental imagery uses many of the same mechanisms
as visual perception (Kosslyn et al. 2001). Imagining a visual scene or performing a
task that involves visualization activate the same primary visual cortex (Le Bihan et
al. 1993). Damage to the visual cortex most often impairs the ability to form mental
images (Farah 1988). We have a strong parallel here with simulactions, which were
shown also to exploit many of the same brain centers as actual intentional execution of
actions. And, just as simulactions were said to inherit a sense of motor self-intention-
ality from the machinery of motor imagery, it makes sense to expect mental imagery or
simulimagery to inherit a sense of perceptual self-intentionality from how the visual
system works (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003).
Yet, again as in the case of simulactions, such a basic but low-level sense of
perceptual self-intentionality may be necessary but not sufficient for an internal sense
of the thoughtful intentionality of one’s own simulimages. It is not enough to know
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that a mental image I form of X is about the X I remember seeing some time ago.
The similarity may be accidental. Or I might hallucinate or fantasize a mental image
that happens to be close enough to or even match a former visual image. The fact that
mental images represent what they do, by exploiting the visual system and its outputs,
is part of how they acquire their own intentionality, but that fact does not yet explain
my sense and awareness, as active simulimager, of the intentionality of my mental
images.
As in the case of my simulactions, I must also consciously intend my mental images
to represent the X in question (or whatever). And intending my mental images to rep-
resent what they do entails my being able to self-regulate my mental imagery as a
purposeful cognitive activity. Solving a visual problem (e.g., how to fit the bulky suit-
case in the puny trunk of a small car) or figuring out visually how parts may fit into
a whole (e.g., organizing the furniture in a room) requires an awareness that one’s
own visually simulative thoughts represent what one intends them to represent. It also
requires an ability to check on and improve the fit between the intention to represent
and the actual outcome. For some tasks, such as making and using tools, some people
(or even some primate species) may be better mental imagers than others, and for
many tasks training can refine mental imagery. Both mastery of mental imaging and
improving it by training may be a matter of working on the self-regulation of mental
imagery.
How the self-regulation of mental imagery works and therefore how it delivers
a sense of the self-intentionality of one’s simulimages are difficult topics that are
beyond the scope and competence of this paper. Some evidence suggests that the
ontogenetically simpler and earlier forms of mental imagery are likely to take off
from the visuomotor machinery of simulaction and the regulatory machinery of per-
ception itself, even when dealing with abstract tasks that do not involve actions or
specific percepts, respectively. Thus, it has been shown that transformations of mental
images—as, for example, in action-free mental rotation—are largely guided by (what
was called earlier) metamotor imagery (Wexler et al. 1998). Such a result comports
with the behavioral immediacy and concreteness (so to speak) of the young child’s
simulative thinking. And if it turns out that language and language-like processes are
also involved in generating and regulating mental imagery—as they are likely to, since
we often literally talk ourselves into simulimaging and revising simulimages—then
the sense of self-intentionality of the young child’s mental images is likely to be shaped
in part by the semantics of her early language. As I read developmentally the message
of cognitive linguistics, the child’s early semantics is likely to be embodied (in the
sense of embodied cognition) and tied to action and perception patterns and other
forms of interacting with concrete situations (Tomasello 2003).
Having made a case for the tight link between the child’s sense of thoughtful
self-intentionality and the self-regulation of her simulative thinking (itself a lower-
level form of self-regulating future actions and perceptions), I want to conclude with
the suggestion that the late ontogenesis of off-line simulactions and simulimages
and of their intramental self-regulation confirms the fact that intentionality-sensitive
self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes develop differently from other-ascriptions
and largely for different reasons.
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5 The late development of inside loops
Let us first recall from earlier sections three major features of the naive psychology
of early childhood: its predominant orientation toward other minds, its situatedness in
the here-and-now of perception and motivation, and its on-line operation. I think these
three features conspire to keep the mind of the young child blind to itself, not experi-
entially but executively and hence metaintentionally or metasemantically, due to the
late development of intramental self-regulation and anticipative off-line simulation.
If the argument of this paper (and of Bogdan 2005a) is right, this late development
prevents the young child’s naive psychology to turn to its thoughtful self and attitudes.
This conclusion is fortified, I think, by a revealing connection between the left
hemisphere and the early dominance of situated and on-line other-ascriptions. The
left hemisphere is the seat of basic, specialized and mostly evolution-installed facul-
ties (Corcoran 2000; Deacon 1997). In intensely sociopolitical species like primates
and humans, one would expect natural selection to pressure for first figuring out the
minds of conspecifics from their observable behaviors and relations to a shared world,
and one would expect the same in the helpless and adult-dependent primate and human
offspring (Tomasello 1999; also Bogdan 1997, 2000, 2003).
Yet nothing said so far should suggest that young children cannot simulate their own
actions and perceptions for self-regulatory purposes. The suggestion, rather, is that the
their simulactions and simulimages are likely to be situated and on-line, and hence
anchored in and mostly guided by current desires and perceptions. Young children
can imagine partly possible situations as limited variations on currently perceived or
desired themes. They imagine situations that resemble a currently perceived or desired
one but may differ through some permutation, addition or omission of some elements.
In contrast, the older child’s simulations of actions and perceptions are different in
that they can be unsituated, off-line, and often totally divorced from current perception
and motivation.
I think that pretending, mental imagery and mental rehearsal exhibit this contrast.
The pretend play of early childhood is situated and guided by current desires and
perceptions, whereas the pretense of later childhood can be unsituated and thoroughly
imaginative and often speculative. Or so I read the data from the psychological lit-
erature (Harris 2000; Perner 1991), as I argued elsewhere (Bogdan 2005b). Also,
according to Piaget and other psychologists, young children are poor mental imagers,
apparently unable to form mental images required in mental rotation tests or to use
images to solve visual-spatial problems (Foulkes 1999, pp. 65–66; Piaget and Inhelder
1971). Piaget distinguished between reproductive images that reenact previous experi-
ences and anticipatory images that represent novel and unexperienced transformations
of images. He thought that until around 7 children cannot entertain images of the latter
sort. This pessimism is not shared by more recent research (Bjorklund 2000, chapter 7).
Even if 7 is too late, Piaget’s distinction may still work for early childhood and, for
that period, it seems to fit other limitations mentioned here.
Mental rehearsal is a concept meant to cover a family of forms of mental simulation
and anticipative imagination. Mental rehearsal seems to follow the same gradual and
laborious development as mental imagery, autobiographical memory and narration.
Preschoolers rarely plan and rehearse a simple arbitrary sequence, when required to
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retain it over a brief period (Bjorklund 2000). They fail to realize the value of mental
rehearsal even after demonstration, and cannot reflect on the successive parts of their
behavior or relate their mental rehearsal to subsequent task performance (Flavell et al.
1995).
Imaginative pretense, mental imagery, mental rehearsal, sequential reasoning, and
in general simulative thinking—all require inhibition, before anything else, as a step to
unsituatedness and off-line operation. Or, as already noted, inhibition becomes opera-
tive only after the 3–4 interval. These same simulative activities also require an ability
to operate simultaneously with and interconnect many and often conflicting repre-
sentations. A multiplex mind owes a great deal to the interconnectivity of the right
hemisphere, which also develops slowly, particularly after the age of 4. Inhibition and
the multiplex ability to open simultaneously several mental screens and switch from
one screen to another as well as connect them bring about unsituated, off-line sim-
ulations about possible situations or indeed about other simulations (thoughts about
thoughts). The self-regulation of all these kinds of off-line simulations, targeting their
intentional directedness and adequacy, is managed, by way of inside loops, by an
executive metasemantics deployed by the prefrontal cortex. The latter, too, was noted
to undergo a major burst of development only after the 3–4 interval (Diamond 2001).
It is in this neurodevelopmental context that the child acquires a sense of the inten-
tionality of her own thoughts, first as simulations of actions and perceptions, and then
as unsituated, anticipative and fully imaginative off-line simulations, including simu-
lations of simulations—all critical conditions for the self-ascriptions of thoughts and
hence attitudes.
6 Envoi
Little has been said here about the naive-psychological concepts that govern the self-
ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes, except that the concepts incorporate the recogni-
tion of thoughtful self-intentionality. If the argument of this paper is on the mark, the
child’s concepts of self-attitudes cannot be formed in quite the same as the concepts
of other-attitudes, as is most often assumed in the developmental literature (Bog-
dan 2005a). A full account of self-ascriptive concepts of thoughts and attitudes must
explain when and how the executive metasemantics aimed at one’s own intentional
mind is aligned to the public and other-directed ascriptions of attitudes and in general
to the public epistemic and naive-psychological discourse and ascriptional practices.
That is a story for another time. But one implication can be discerned even at this
stage.
A self-directed naive psychology is likely to be a hybrid construction that combines
other-directed ascriptional concepts, self-regulatory mechanisms, and norms of public
discourse and ascriptional practices. I think (but have not argued here) that even the
other-directed naive psychology of early childhood is a hybrid of specialized mecha-
nisms that join a variety of resources, with different functional agendas, not all initially
implicated in naive psychology (Bogdan 1997, 2000). The upshot is that, contrary to
prevailing opinions, no unitary and domain-specific account is likely to explain naive
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psychology, other- as well as self-directed. But this need not be a surprise: the human
mind itself is a complicated hybrid. Why should its naive psychology be any different?
Acknowledgements I borrowed the title ‘Inside Loops’ from Keith Lehrer’s excellent book Self-Trust
(Oxford University Press, 1997). This paper went through several versions, read in several places, where
it occasioned many useful and insightful comments, criticisms and suggestions. I thank Keith Lehrer very
warmly for his thoughtful input and for being so supportive in so many ways during the work on this paper. I
also thank audiences at the University of Arizona, Tucson, and the University of Bucharest, as well as select
group of participants at the 3rd International Colloquium in Analytic Philosophy in Bucharest, May 2005.
Warm thanks to Dan Dennett for an extensive discussion of the notion of self-intentionality while driving
through and admiring the bucolic landscapes of southern Transylvania.
References
Astington, J. W., & Gopnik, A. (1988). Knowing y’ve changed your mind. In J. Astington, P. Harris,
& D. Olson (Eds.), Developing theories of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bjorklund, D. F. (2000). Children’s thinking. Belmont: Wadworth.
Bogdan, R. J. (1997). Interpreting minds. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bogdan, R. J. (2000). Minding minds. Cambridge, MIT Press.
Bogdan, R. J. (2003). Watch your metastep: The first-order limits of early intentional attributions. In
C. Kanzian et al. (Eds.), Persons. Vienna: obv&hpt.
Bogdan, R. J. (2005a). Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late. In B. Malle & S. Hodges (Eds.),
Other minds. New York: Guilford Press.
Bogdan, R. J. (2005b). Pretending as imaginative rehearsal for cultural conformity. Journal of Cognition
and Culture, 5, 191–213.
Bogdan, R. J. (2008). Predicative minds. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Clements, W., & Perner, J. (1994). Implicit understanding of belief. Cognitive Development, 9, 377–397.
Corcoran, R. (2000). Theory of mind in other clinical conditions. In S. Baron-Cohen et al. (Eds.), Under-
standing other minds (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). Recreative minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens. San Diego: Harcourt.
Deacon, T. (1997). The Symbolic Species. New York: Norton.
Decety, J., Jeannerod, M., & Prablanc, C. (1989). The timing of mentally represented actions. Behavioural
Brain Research, 34, 35–42.
Diamond, A. (2001). Normal developments of prefrontal cortex from birth to young adulthood. In
D. T. Stuss, & R. T. Knight (Eds.), The frontal lobes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Farah, M. J. (1988). Is visual imagery really visual? Psychological Review, 95, 307–331.
Flavell, J. H., Green, F. L., & Flavell, E. R. (1995) Young children’s knowledge about thinking. Monographs
of the Society for Research in Child Development, 60, 1–96.
Foulkes, D. (1999). Children’s dreaming and the development of consciousness. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Goldman, A. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 15–28.
Gopnik, A. (1993). How we know our minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 1–14.
Harris, P. (2000). The work of imagination. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hesslow, G. (2002). Conscious thought as simulation of behavior and perception. Trends in Cognitive
Science, 6, 242–247.
Hobson, R. P. (1993). Autism and the development of mind. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2003). Ways of seeing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 187–245.
Jeannerod, M. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford: Blackwell.
Jeannerod, M. (1999). To act or not to act. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1–29.
Jeannerod, M. (2003a). Consciousness of action and self-consciousness. In J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.),
Agency and self-awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jeannerod, M. (2003b). Simulation of action a unifying concept for motor cognition. In S. Johnson-Frey
(Ed.), Taking action. Cambridge: MIT Press.
123
Synthese (2007) 159:235–251 251
Kosslyn, S. M., Ganis, G., & Thompson, W. L. (2001). Neural foundations of imagery. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 2, 635–642.
Le Bihan, D., Turner, R., Zeffiro, T. A., Cuénod, C. A., Jezzard, P., & Bonnert, V. (1993). Activation of
human primary visual cortex during visual recall. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
90, 11802–11805.
Nelson, K. (1996). Language in cognitive development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1971). Mental imagery in the child. New York: Basic Books.
Russell, J. (1996). Agency. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Wexler, A., Kosslyn, S., & Berthoz, A. (1998). Motor processes in mental rotation. Cognition, 68, 77–94.
Wolpert, D., Miall, R., & Kawato, M. (1998). Internal models of the cerebellum. Trends in Cognitive
Science, 2, 338–347.
123
